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AIR FORCE INSPECTOR EXAMINES TORNADO PROBLEM

DW041447 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 4 Mar 81 p 5

[Adelbert Weinstein report on interview with air force inspector, General Obleser--
date and place not given]

[Text] Bonn, 3 March--The discussion about the financing gap with regard to the multipurpose plane, Tornado, must not lead to the wrong conclusion that the security of the Federal Republic is endangered. This was stated by air force inspector, General Obleser, in a talk with Frankfurter ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG. The imputation that the Tornado was the result of wrong planning on the part of the air force also must be rejected. The idle talk that the German Army would particularly suffer from the pressure for a financial shift entailing monetary cuts for all branches of the armed forces to fill the gap in the financial planning for Tornado is unfounded. "Naturally, all are involved in the shortage of funds. We, the air force, will also be deprived of money which we urgently need based on our defense plans. The air force probably will have to do without systems which are actually indispensable for a balanced air force armament.

"I have imposed extreme restraint on myself and my staff in connection with the Tornado discussion," said General Obleser. He believed that in examining the situation every objective observer would interpret relationships correctly. But he has heard the most contradictory theses in public. "I believe, therefore, that I, as the air force inspector, ought to act against the concern that we might have made mistakes in military planning and that others would have to foot the bill." He wants to base his correction on arguments which should not be considered accusations or even excuses.

First, why and how the Tornado planning came about has to be clarified. "This concept came about for two reasons. When defense abandoned the strategy of massive retaliation and when the main emphasis of the deterrence doctrine was put on conventional defense, the air force also had to change its armament and give preference to conventional arms." The planes of those times were mainly fighter bombers. With nuclear arms, they could have carried out their task at any time. With conventional arms, however, they would not have been able to "concentrate massive and immediate combat strength wherever necessary." It was, therefore, logical to develop and produce an arms system which would have a credible deterrence effect, or if deterrence did not work, be able to fight effectively.

"The second reason to equip the air force with a multipurpose plane of the Tornado type has to do with our weather and our climate." Europe's air forces always have to cope with a special handicap. The planes might have to fly at almost any time and even in very bad weather. But in central Europe, exceptional meteorological situations develop almost continuously--bad weather situations which keep the planes grounded. "In certain bad weather situations, therefore, the enemy cannot be attacked directly on the ground. Direct support of our own troops through attacks by NATO planes on the mobile, mechanized and armored units of an enemy calls for most accurate identification of targets." The flying arms systems were unable to do this at that time. To have an effective forward defense, one must be able to wage a defensive fight at any time, in every situation and in any kind of weather. The shift from massive retaliation to flexible response has almost forced the decision on the air force planners to construct a model that can live up to this far-reaching new task. "We cannot remain a grounded air force when the army is threatened by an enemy who exploits miserable weather conditions to launch an assault with masses of tanks."

The last impetus for the development of the Tornado plane came from the 6-day war in Israel. "We have carefully analyzed the tactical situation and weather conditions. Transplanted to the strategic situation in central Europe, the examination showed that we would not have been able to fly at all during the first 3 days."

Technical developments also encouraged the air force to build the new MRCA (multi-role combat aircraft) plane. "This involves microminiaturization of electronics: the experience of the Americans with the F-111 and of the British with the TSR-2. For the first time, it seemed possible for us to introduce a system which could concentrate the effectiveness of arms at any place on the field of combat regardless of the weather."

The Daring Idea of the All-Round Plane

The air force leadership naturally has examined whether it would be more important to give preference to intensified air defense or to develop a flying arms system that would immediately close gaps in forward defense if an enemy tried to break through. "Theoretically, a 'high performance fighter' was competing at that time with a plane which primarily was supposed to eliminate the threat on the ground." There was even the daring idea to build an all-round plane that could fulfill both demands. "We found out quickly, however, that both demands would have resulted in the construction of a plane that would have been impossible to finance. Technically, too, such a project could not be handled."

So the decision was made to fill the bad weather gap to thus support forward defense from the air. "The TKF (tactical fighter plane) was supposed to later on become the second leg of air defense. We were able to proceed in this manner because the American F-15 appeared on the horizon of Atlantic air defense. Its effectiveness promised to fulfill all conditions of the transition period."

General Obleser said in conclusion that even at the risk of repeating himself he wanted to formulate the demands of the planners with regard to the development of the Tornado plane as follows: "The plane was to ensure that we would be able to fly regardless of the weather. The Tornado must be able to fight under all

visibility conditions, regardless of whether it was at night, in fog, rain or snow. The attack of an adversary must be counteracted at the moment of greatest weakness, namely, when the enemy is forced to concentrate his forces, when he wants to cross rivers or if his movements are channeled by the terrain. A concentrated Tornado attack ought to first slow down the combat action of a possible enemy and then foil it."

This task would naturally not be handled by the German Air Force alone. "The German Air Force is fully and absolutely subordinated to NATO even in peacetime. So we do not have a national defense concept. We, as the air force, have not been given any special combat strips limited to our state area, strips we would have to take care of. As far as we are concerned, air war is overall warfare with all allied air forces, all allied divisions and naval forces in the whole NATO area." This is why the Tornado crisis, to the extent one may speak of a crisis strategically at all, does not concern the German Air Force alone. The solution of the problems that have arisen is of interest to the allies as well.

If what is now being referred to as the Tornado affair is viewed from this angle, then the thesis is not tenable that the German Air Force, by the closure of the Tornado finance gap, deprives the ground forces of DM6 to DM8 billion and thus weakens forward defense. To begin with, nobody knows that sums of money will have to be withdrawn from other branches of service. "I would be unable to tell you today how much 'foreign' money will be needed to finance the Tornado, what will be taken from the pot of the branches of service and what will be put into the Tornado pot. Forecasts are hard to make because what this involves cannot be a one-time financial matter. All I know is that the air force helped out when it was necessary to fill gaps for other branches of service."

On the other hand, he, being the inspector of the air force, cannot but compliment the ground forces. Doubts definitely need not arise with respect to the German ground forces about the mission of forward defense being met even if funds are withdrawn from our army divisions and transferred to the Tornado. There are other ground forces whose quality and armament could well cause a soldier to be concerned." Naturally, it does make a difference to him whether the plans of the other branches of service need to be amended. "But I expect the other branches of service to have a similar attitude toward the overall defense of NATO as I have as the inspector of the air force."

The Malady Hits All

At the moment, all parties are suffering from a situation where everything that it needs militarily cannot be procured to the extent and at the time planned. "This is particularly painful at this time because we no longer have a reserve which we otherwise occasionally had a chance to dip into. But the malady doesn't hit just one branch of service. It hits all. But, I have to admit that the sacrifice this time needs to be made for the Tornado. We must, however, realize that the strict separation of the individual branches of service, the financial commitment to priorities considered incontestable are past history." General Obleser said that he sees the main purpose of the closed meeting which begins this Wednesday in the explanation of the consequences: "This must entail decisions which will, however, not only make allowances for procurement questions, but which will go far beyond them."

General Obleser stressed that an old strategic rule must not be disregarded: "The whole thing must not be measured by the question of what I can afford at this time. The starting point of any military consideration in our present situation remains the mission." He can only repeat that conventional defense is the basis of Western strategy. "When massive retaliation was valid, the rule of thumb was: Oh well, we do what we can, if worse comes to worst, we will take the nuclear bludgeon. People then discovered that this simplification is at odds with strategic reality. The concept was amended. Conventional defense prevailed. But if we were to declare now that conventional armament is becoming too expensive because all weapons systems are growing more sophisticated and, as a result, more expensive, then only one alternative would be left: lowering the nuclear threshold." This reciprocal effect has to be seen by everybody now lamenting the wave of spending. It is up to the politicians to decide whether such a security policy would then be the last ratio. Soldiers can merely say that an about-face which militarily brings about the opposite of what actually was planned strategically would cause unnecessary costs running into the billions.

If somebody asks whether at least the number of units of the Tornado could be reduced, then he as the inspector of the air force can only reply: "That could be done, but it will not cut the costs of the project. On the contrary, such a decision would be even more expensive for us." When parliament approved the Tornado project in 1975, the required funds were set aside. The budget committee and the defense committee regarded the financial requirements at that time to be manageable. Then the economic conditions changed. Since the Tornado project from the very outset had been a supranational project--Britons and Italians are participating in it--the Federal Republic of Germany from the very beginning had to carry the foreign inflation rates as well. "Our own inflation rate also increased, above all in specific technological sectors."

"The Tornado program was devised as a multinational project quite on purpose. The governments had to undertake commitments ensuring that quickly made negative decisions would not jeopardize the whole program." This was intended to prevent a dropout from the Tornado project or interference in Tornado planning. "I am aware that this was a basic demand of the governments who were a party to the contract at the time. Actually, it was our basic demand because at the time we did not see the risk on our part, instead we feared that the others might drop out. The fact that this has turned into the exact opposite today is attributable not only to the shortage of money, but also to the budgetary cameralism."

Being a flier, however, he wanted to conclude the interview with a positive remark: "The experiences gained with the Tornado weapons systems so far are excellent." More than a dozen planes are already flying. They have been concentrated in Great Britain where they serve as training planes for the future Tornado pilots. At the same time, one is experimenting with the flying era of the eighties, something which the Tornado will no doubt help characterize. In this connection, the pilots have made the following finding: "The fault rate is far below what we expected it to be. The utilization of the Tornado airplane is much greater than planned, even though not all automatic test equipment is as yet available." Considering the problems the German Air Force has had with all the systems it bought abroad, he, as the inspector, can only say that "the Tornado system is proceeding much better."

If he were asked whether he would build this plane today as well, that is to say, if he had to make a decision for or against the Tornado now and the project did not already exist, he would reply: "One can only say yes to the Tornado. But if the financing could not be guaranteed, I would no longer demand this aircraft. Because the basic prerequisites for the manufacture of a high-efficiency aircraft are its practicability and the ability to finance it."

CSO: 3103

ENERGY PROJECTS STATUS CRITICIZED

Athens EXORMISI in Greek 8 Feb 81 pp 5,11

[Article by Giorgos Stathis: "Eleven Billion Kilowatts Lost Every Year"]

[Text] The news published in EXORMISI last week, according to which the installation and operation of the first nuclear station to produce electricity in our country is imminent, makes again timely a great question: Has the time for this choice really arrived? Is there not another, more favorable solution which has priority? The answer in which the inquiry which we are publishing today ended is that the Right follows, in this critical sector, the same known tactic which it has applied every time it was required to make definite decisions: expediencies of every type and local and foreign private interests always have priority in relation to the more general interests of the country and people....

The start of preliminary works for establishment of a network of electricity-producing nuclear stations and the analogous amending of regulations for arrangement of DEI [Public Power Corporation] services--which EXORMISI revealed in its previous issue--was not a sudden decision. It concerns an adoption of well-known choices of the government, the latest announcement of which occurred in December when the DEI Representative Assembly met. At that time, R. Moisis, administrator of this large public enterprise, said, among other things: "Imported coal and nuclear energy, along with hydrodynamics, will be the main sources on which will be based the development of the system in the 1990's."

Moisis supported this viewpoint on the following data: "With complete utilization of the known lignite and hydraulic potential, the anticipated needs of Greece for 1989 are barely covered. What will happen afterwards? For this reason, we must hereafter program the use of alternative, imported--by necessity--energy sources. At the present time, only coal and nuclear energy are offered as such sources."

Energy Sources

The question posited at this point is: When must imported energy sources really be used and in what proportions?

It is clear that the interest of the country and people demand that local capabilities be exhausted before huge sums of precious exchange are spent to import energy sources.

But let us look at what has happened up to now and what is going to happen in the future, according to the choices of the Right.

The first conclusion from what Moisis said is that heretofore the country would have been able to cover its needs for electricity with indigenous sources. As the DEI administrator said to the assembly, the maximum production of power, using lignite, can reach 32 billion kilowatts. In addition, it is known that the economically exploitable hydrodynamics of the country can provide 15 billion kilowatts a year. Therefore, Greece can have a total of 47 billion kilowatts a year from indigenous sources.

Greece will require such a yearly consumption of electric energy around 1990. In 1979, consumption was only 19.2 billion kilowatts. So the conclusion freely emerges that the use of imported coal and nuclear energy will be indispensable after 1990, providing that new indigenous sources will not have been discovered by then.

From the above, it becomes clear that in all the decades up to now Greece could have supported its electricity production on indigenous sources, that is on hydroelectric and lignite stations. In fact, up until a few years ago--when consumption was still far below 15 billion kilowatts--production could have come exclusively from exploitation of hydrodynamics.

And yet none of these occurred. According to Moisis' data, 36 percent of the 1979 electricity production was covered by use of imported energy sources and, more specifically, expensive oil! Adversely, Greece's hydrodynamics remains, in essence, unexploited and, as river waters flow into the sea, 11 billion kilowatts a year are lost with them.

Of 33, Only Three

More specifically, from studies made by DEI in conjunction with foreign companies, it has emerged that 33 large hydroelectric works can be constructed on the eight main rivers of Greece. And yet, up to now, only three have been built, another six have been programmed for the decade 1980 to 1990 and the remaining 24 will remain for later....

The result of this tactic, as concerns comparisons on an international level, is shown by the following percentages: In Luxembourg, hydroelectric production covers 25.7 percent of the total electricity production and thermoelectric 74.3 percent; in Italy, the corresponding percentages are 28 percent for hydroelectric and 69.5 percent for thermoelectric production; in Yugoslavia, the percentages are 52.5 (hydroelectric) and 47.5; in Austria, we have 65.5 percent and 34.5 percent correspondingly and in Switzerland, hydroelectric production covers 75.7 percent of the total needs of the country. Finally, in Greece, the corresponding percentage is only 17.7 percent!

Now is the fact that waters are allowed to run unexploited into the sea translated into exchange? The 11 billion kilowatts which are lost every year because of the non-existence of hydroelectric stations correspond to approximately 2.7 million tons of oil, or 20.5 million barrels, or 820 million dollars (at 40 dollars a barrel). If DEI dismantled the oil stations which presently produce six to eight billion kilowatts a year and burn 1.5 million tons of oil, the country would save exchange on the order of 450 million dollars a year.

This would happen without the total hydrodynamics which today remain unexploited having been used. This means that utilization of the remaining part of the hydrodynamics would also save ample quantities of indigenous lignite which are presently being used prematurely.

In fact, as regards lignite, we must not forget that this concerns the non-renewal of an energy source which, according to DEI studies and programs, will have been exhausted in the first decade of the next century, if full development of the lignite mines is completed by 1988, as is anticipated.

Priority

It is clear that development of hydroelectric production has at this moment an immediate priority not only because it will contribute to saving exchange which is spent to import oil, not only because consumption of indigenous lignite will be decreased, but also because it will restrict the quantities of nuclear, lignite and coal production which will be required later.

Therefore, instead of the construction of thermoelectric and nuclear plants being planned at this moment, it would be far more beneficial for the country to begin an extensive program to develop the hydroelectric works for which suitability studies have been performed.

Supporting this choice is the additional fact that, for example, one lignite plant producing 300 megawatts of electricity is worth about 180 million dollars in exchange, while a corresponding hydroelectric plant is worth only 40 million dollars. This happens because only 20 percent of the total expense of a lignite plant can be allocated in drachmas, while, correspondingly, 80 percent of the expenditure for construction of a hydroelectric work remains in the country (dam, tunnels, etc.).

To all this must certainly be added the creation of employment which is far greater in the case of hydroelectric works, but also the additional uses of the latter (irrigation, fish cultivation in the artificial lake, etc.). Moreover, we should point out that operation of hydroelectric works is continuing for a long time after their theoretic "burn out" as is happening, for example, in Switzerland where similar works have continued to operate since the beginning of the century.

Such a program of hydroelectric development demands a real interest, a thing which is presently lacking from the government and, by extension, DEI. It is characteristic that while the average construction time of hydroelectric works during 1950 to 1975 was four years for each work, the Pournarion work on the Arakthos River has last 19 years.

It seems, however, that hydroelectric development is contrary to the interests of local and foreign monopolies which the government is not been willing or able to oppose. Those who control the distribution and commerce of liquid fuels have every interest in maintaining their clientele. At the same time, the much publicized turn to imported coal—which is suggested as a solution of "liberation" from oil—is essentially deception of the public since coal is controlled by the same monopolies: Mobil, Shell, Exxon, etc.

Finally, it is unnecessary for us to explain what parties are pressuring the Greek Right in the swiftest possible importing of nuclear energy, to the deficit, certainly, of the Greek economy and its technological dependence.

All the above persuade that giving priority to hydroelectric production is at this moment a critical choice in the interest of the national economy. In fact, it is interesting to note that it is not necessary for the truly large capital demanded for this purpose to burden to a large percentage the DEI investments program. The method of "self-financing" can best be used; it would suffice for DEI to sell power to heavy industries (Pessine, Larko, Khalyvourgiki, etc.) at its real value.

But something on this order presumes a more general change, political and social, since only within the frameworks of such a change can nationally beneficial decisions be made--in this case as well.

9247

CSO: 4908

PSI DOCUMENT ISSUED ON NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN

Rome AVANTI in Italian 21 Jan 81 p 14

[Article: "A Careful Consideration of the National Energy Plan"]

[Text] At a meeting to examine the situation of the sector and the new national energy plan prepared by the minister of industry, the Economic Commission and the Energy Commission of the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] confirmed the full and permanent validity of the positions adopted by the party, from the 1977 resolution of the directorate to the parliamentary motions presented in 1980 and that were closely examined at the 12 and 13 May 1980 meeting. According to a communique, the commissions believe that the path followed in our country, during the 7 years subsequent to the formal beginning of the energy crisis, with respect to an abdication of the responsibilities and initiatives for reform, which resulted in a continuance of special incentives and interests, absolutely does not respond to the general interest, as witnessed by the worsening of the situation in the sector and by its growing negative burden on the country's economic and social development.

The abundance and the intensity of the problems of the sector, for which there must be a coherent and clearcut solution, require instead a great political commitment and a great desire for reform. The difficulties connected with our energy system and the consequent burdens of a heavy dependence on primary sources must be confronted with a comprehensive and coherent vision of the economic policy. The processes of change, of internal economic and social development, must be combined with a foreign policy action that will develop relations of mutual cooperation and of financial, technological, and raw material exchanges with producer countries and countries that are being developed.

The inefficacy of the two preceding energy plans confirms not only the extreme inadequacy and serious deficiencies of the approaches that have been pursued hitherto and which have been pointed out many times by the PSI, but also the underlying actual choice of granting privileges with respect to time and methods, the continuation of special interests and of political and economic subordinative conditions.

The presentation of a new energy plan, as of now still in an initial stage of political appraisal, represents a correct, even if tardy, formal answer to the demands of the PSI. It is nevertheless essential that this formal answer be

followed by a definitive appraisal by the executive and also with the responsible involvement of the regions and of the social forces prior to a careful deliberation by parliament. The PSI Energy Commission believes that the general objectives contained in the present text of the plan are acceptable on the whole, but they must be integrated with the functions of the regional and local structures, with matters of tariff policy as instruments of economic and social policy, with more clearcut directions regarding international initiatives connected with North-South relations, with more specific and full directions regarding the problems of the technological development of the sector and the problems of the re-establishment of the socio-economic stability of the country, and with a more complete vision of the various components and interventions that characterize the entire energy problem. With reference to the statement of the analyses and the proposals contained in the plan, the Energy Commission believes that they will not assure the attainment of the indicated objectives unless they coincide, as in the case of energy conservation, with the spontaneous course of the trends. It believes that many important points in the present text must be greatly modified. Contradictions, ambiguity, and errors, even formal ones, confirm the limits of a preparation that was not only hasty, but one that still reveals the prevalence, in addition to general commitments, of partial and special interests, thus again suggesting as a matter of fact the conduct that has been followed up to now. The proposal for liberalization of prices and the recourse to the ready fiscal burdens are only two examples that confirm this trend, while they are not able to inspire any real change in the structure of consumption.

The development of a procedure for the conservation and the rational use of energy is belied by the very data of the document, which show that: the relationship between the amount of the final uses and the total amount of the primary sources used could be reduced from 1978 to 1990, causing the overall energy system yield to decrease; petroleum system losses will remain constant, if not greater; the increase in unobligated electric consumption will follow an upward line that is substantially analogous to that of the obligated uses; the amount of the contribution from renewable sources at the end of the eighties is limited to 1 percent of the total needed. The planning of agreements for participation in the extractive sector of coal and for a realization of all of the infrastructures in order to almost quadruple the consumption of coal still appear precarious and not well developed; the change in the electronuclear quota is contradicted by assigning it to the ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] energy program, and the methods of realization and administration from the point of view of safety and technological autonomy are insufficient and uncertain with regard to time. The two topics on the horizon--environmental protection and research and development--are assigned, one to a chapter on problems without specific commitments for scheduled installations and the other, while mentioned now and then, is also put off now and then to another plan that is still being formulated, but which should instead be completely integrated and contextual. Financial estimates often seem improvised and contradictory, as for example in the case of the conservation and rational use of energy, where 1220 billion are appropriated for the 1980-1983 3-year period compared with 2060 billion for the 7 years from 1984 to 1990.

The main topic of petroleum remains in the background, wrapped in general and evasive discussion; the role and the functions of regional organisms, the realization of operative energy structures at these levels, provide no valid reference nor any specific proposal.

According to the communique, these are only some of the possible and necessary notations that cannot help but cause serious perplexities and that at this point urgently require exact political evaluations.

In the face, then, of a process for a thorough re-elaboration, of significant revisions, and of full and responsible participation, the Energy Commission calls attention to the urgency and the continuing seriousness of problems which, in the absence of a definite and seriously implemented programmatic framework, cannot help but make a negative contribution by causing the situation in the country to become worse. The Energy Commission thus believes that it is necessary to avoid the continuance of a lack of responsible political initiative during the long wait for the text of a politically acceptable program supported by a parliamentary vote. In this regard it believes that it is thus necessary to stress action that will enable the 3-year economic plan to make use of a valid programmatic framework for the energy sector and for some opportune verifications of conformity and consistency. The long moratorium of these past years more than anything has created an accumulation of very great unresolved problems, which cannot be faced contextually in a short time.

The radical revision of the national energy plan must include a clarification regarding actions and priority and coherent measures that require implementation during the 3-year period. The lines of conduct and the solutions that must be pursued within a strict framework must, then, concern:

- The overcoming of the protraction of a legislative void, developing parliamentary action and promptly initiating measures that are already being discussed, such as the law on conservation in some sectors and on alternative sources (law 655), opportune amendments, and the CNEN (National Nuclear Energy Commission) reform law, with the separation of responsibilities for nuclear safety control to be realized by the National Health Service;
- The start of an action that would stimulate regional and/or district firms as new operative poles of the energy policy. This action can and must now be included in the final formulation of law 655;
- A specific institutionalization of the role of the regions in the formulation and administration of the energy plan as a primary and necessary element for a more complete reorganization by the executive, which should lead to a capable synthesis and unitary responsibility;
- An exceptional intervention for the purpose of accelerating and developing the realization of methane pipeline networks in the South that will involve industry

and regional administrations, through opportune promotion and technical assistance, and for the purpose of reserving the additional supply of methane gas for civilian and industrial installations in the South.

- The revision of laws concerning the installation of coal and nuclear thermo-electric power plants that will guarantee the responsible intervention of the regions in the selection of sites and in the protection of the people and the land and that will provide a territorial program for the interventions as a whole, not merely monetary ones, and that will also assure permanent jobs, at least at sites in the South;
- The beginning and the conclusion in 1981 of a discussion of the reform of the law on industrial reconversion and reconstruction in accordance with a line that will promote changes in the energy budgets of enterprises;
- The making of political agreements with producer countries regarding all importation quotas of hydrocarbons reserved for our country, eliminating conditions and misrepresentations, and realizing comprehensive terms of mutual benefit;
- The definition and the start of a plan to change the refining system which, correctly determining the evolution of the demand for various products, will on the one hand know how to adapt the yields of plants and reduce waste and, on the other, to offer further elements for agreement with producer countries.
- In conclusion, the Energy Commission believes that, in a political stage of great complexity and general difficulty in the country, it is essential for the party to support that developmental role and framework in a sector where a decisive action for great reform and renewal seems basic.

8255

CSO: 3104

VON WEIZSAECKER ON ELECTION TEAM, CAMPAIGN

Bonn DIE WELT in German 7/8 Feb 81 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Richard von Weizsaecker, CDU candidate for the Berlin senat, by Diethart Goos, in Berlin; date not given]

[Text] WELT: As Governing Mayor Vogel said, just the members of your team who have been named so far demand respect and esteem from a political opponent. What does the complete list look like?

Weizsaecker: To characterize the look and direction of my team, I am now putting forward six politicians from Berlin and four from West Germany. Those from Berlin are parliamentary President Heinrich Lummer, fraction chairman Eberhard Diepgen, and myself as Land chairman designate. There are also three younger candidates: Bundestag delegate Gerhard Kunz, member of the House of Delegates Dr Volker Hassemer and, for a still to be created Office for Foreign Workers, Mrs Barbara John.

From West Germany, Norbert Blum, Hanna-Renate Laurien, Elmar Pieroth and Prof Wilhelm Kevenick from Kiel.

WELT: Have you discussed a distribution of the Senat's offices with these candidates, in the event of an election victory on 10 May?

Weizsaecker: With few exceptions, no. The team is concerned about direction and the ceration of political will as a whole. A more exact assigning of offices, to the point of a shadow cabinet, would restrict the necessary freedom of action when forming the government itself in an almost unbearable way. I am opposed to shadow cabinets.

WELT: Governing Mayor Vogel is critical of you, saying it's well and good to have a team. But, in the event of an election defeat, is there any assurance that your candidates will remain here and assume the role of the opposition?

Weizsaecker: That holds true for me absolutely. My political charge is here in Berlin and I shall not accept another one subsequently. Additionally, the members of Mr Vogel's Senat, including himself, gave up their mandates in the FRG after their election to the Senat. My colleagues will do the same.

WELT: According to the latest polls, the CDU has acquired almost an absolute majority. Will you seek only autonomous government responsibility or make an offer for a coalition beforehand to the FDP?

Weizsaecker: The election campaign will be run without a coalition offer. But its course will not exclude future coalitions. As far as the results of polls are concerned, I know of none which are truly representative, which reflect the current situation.

WELT: The collection of signatures requesting a plebiscite created a strong sympathy movement in the direction of the CDU. How will you be able to cultivate and expand this movement before election day on 10 May?

Weizsaecker: I am cautious about registering an expression of the electoral will in favor of my party or even myself. The request for a plebiscite is an expression of the people's deep displeasure concerning the use of power by a long-governing party. But a leaning toward another party is not necessarily associated with it. Encouragement for the fundamental democratic idea of a change is certainly associated with it.

WELT: In the event of assuming governmental responsibility, have you worked out solutions to problems such as house takeovers?

Weizsaecker: It is a question of separating those who are genuinely looking for housing from those with totally different goals, who join in while exploiting these conditions.

In the short term a decision must soon be made about the use of more than 600 empty houses and pieces of property. The senator for housing was previously not even in a position to state the number of properties. For the moment rental termination and demolition permits must be suspended. Within the limits of what is possible, those seeking housing should be invited to mediation discussions through the Senat and the city boroughs. This will be effective only to a limited extent. The large numbers of those seeking housing, who are waiting their turn in an orderly fashion, cannot simply be overtaken by those who have drawn attention to themselves in a dramatic fashion. With its plan to make empty dwellings usable with short-term funds the Senate is meeting a CDU request. But this must not prejudice the program for new construction. On the contrary. There must be expansion in this area.

WELT: As governing mayor will you intervene aggressively in the East-West dialogue, if there is a social-liberal government in Bonn?

Weizsaecker: Berlin needs the long-term perspective which is involved in policies for Germany and the East. As important as city-political concerns are as a sign of our inner strength to help ourselves, they alone can do little to ensure the future of Berlin in a historical dimension. An eye for the external situation, which we in Berlin have much more clearly than in all the other Laender, enables and compels us to make our voice heard directly in Bonn—and also with the protecting powers.

WELT: How do you see Berlin's relationship with the United States?

Weizsaecker: It must be noted with satisfaction that in the new American administration there are leading officials in the State Department who are closely linked with Berlin's history and present. The Americans are in Berlin, not just as partners in an alliance, but out of their own sense of involvement and responsibility. I consider the keeping up of a very close exchange of ideas with the Americans by the Berlin government to be not only necessary but also a rewarding task.

WELT: Would you be prepared in addition to seek contacts with officials in East Berlin, such as Lord Mayor Krack, in order to revive the intracity dialogue, which has been cut off for years?

Weizsaecker: As long as I have been active in politics, I have cultivated the contacts which were at all available in East Berlin and the GDR. An official function in the free part of the city must not be an ideological or political barrier to an exchange of ideas.

9581

CSO: 1103

NEW BERLIN MAYOR VOGEL GIVES GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 13 Feb 81 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Vogel: Fight To Keep Berlin Human"]

[Text] West Berlin, 12 February -- Governing Mayor Vogel of Berlin emphasized in his government statement to the House of Delegates that Berlin could only adequately fulfill the mission that has devolved upon it in the course of recent history--maintaining historical connections and the awareness of the common roots of national existence--if it can overcome its communal problems. "Only as a human metropolis can it be a city of plurality, liberality, peace and freedom, whose message has something to say to the people living around Berlin, the people in Germany." Vogel said that democracy collapsed without trust and credibility and he challenged the parties to assist "in joint service to our community" in "realizing a part of political culture through credibility, through strengthening trust, through reflection and through the courage to have new ideas."

Evidence of Communal Crises

Above all, Be. in needed hope, confidence and self-awareness. If problems and mistakes were not hidden, if people faced them with self-awareness, "if we can keep sight of the public welfare beyond contrasts and differences of opinion," then Berlin could again become a city to which many look--not on account of a title or a formula, "but because people are conquering resignation and are fighting for their city; fighting to keep it human." Vogel conceded that Berlin was currently in a crisis which had affected various areas of life in varying degrees. Scarcely any social group and certainly none of the parties represented in the House of Delegates was excepted from it. People were more acutely aware of the SPD crisis because, with one brief interruption, it had provided the governing mayor and borne the responsibility of government in Berlin since the end of the war.

Vogel stressed that the evidence of communal crises, all the false developments and deficiencies with which Berlin had to deal were not problems limited to Berlin. In other metropolitan areas too, there were house takeovers, violent confrontations with the police, a shortage of reasonably priced housing, difficulties in living alongside foreigners, the decline of building material, the loss of the countryside and open spaces to construction for transportation, environmental pollution and drug use. Certainly some of these problems had appeared individually sooner in Berlin than in other places.

The governing mayor said that the standards for the city of the year 2000 were needed now. So the decision had to be made about what was to take precedence: "Man and the development of his personality or the optimization of ground rent? The variety of the landscape, of cultivation, of the private and public function, or the monotonous rush of housing developments? The space-consuming street or the space-saving rail? Quiet, low-traffic zones in which pedestrians and playing children have priority, or the residential street which is misused as a through street and which is blocked by parked vehicles as well? The city as a personality, or the perfect, but anonymous city machine which was freely interchangeable."

Housing Construction and Rents

Human personality was also fulfilled in its achievements. The conventional idea of achievement was oriented almost exclusively toward intellectual achievement, technical skill and the ability to advance socially. Humanly valuable and socially important abilities like imagination, originality, a social-political feeling of responsibility, ability to cooperate, moral and social sensitivity were taken into account insufficiently or not at all. A change in this regard would have to be attempted.

In his government statement Vogel pointed out that the new Senat had introduced preliminary measures to correct undesirable conditions which had occurred as a result of erroneous developments in rebuilding and modernization in Berlin as well. The Senat's action included: measures to reduce the number of empty dwellings and to make sensible interim use possible; offers to induce renters to assist in the modernization and the creation of possibilities for self-help and individual style; making possible the peaceful exploration of alternative possibilities for living and organization. The senate had made DM 20 million available for these goals. Additionally, the senate had begun discussions with those "whose activities had the purpose of drawing attention to injustices and delays in an unusual way, for example, by the peaceful occupation of empty housing, and whose goal is not destruction and violence but the eradication of these deficiencies and injustices." At the same time the senate issued a serious warning against the continued use of force. Bodily injury and property damage were punishable offenses and totally unsuitable methods of overcoming problems. They distributed lawful peace and the peace of the community "and must be prosecuted according to justice and the law." The Senat would maintain this line. The problem could not be solved by calling for the police, the court and the paragraphs of the law, nor by demanding stiffer penalties.

Vogel went on to say that the senate intended to work for the continuation of rent control in older buildings until 1990. According to the regulations currently in force, Berlin is to become a "White Circle" in 1985. The Bundestag would have to vote on an extension of the "Black Circle." As a reason Vogel cited the fact that the housing market in Berlin was much more strained in Berlin than in the remainder of the FRG.

The international building exhibition planned for 1984 in Berlin is to be postponed in its major components until 1986 and it will be concentrated in the inner city areas. In addition, it would have to be more strongly directed toward

the model presentation of various housing forms and oriented toward concrete housing needs. Since the traffic situation in Berlin is more favorable than in comparable West German metropolitan areas, the senate intends to reduce freeway planning for ecological and financial reasons. Planning and construction of the so-called western tangent, an urban freeway between Schoeneberg and Reinickendorf, is to be dropped. The money saved here will benefit the increased expansion of the rapid rail transit network. In this connection the senate is working for the inclusion of the S-Bahn [East German interurban railroad], which is operated by the GDR state railroad, in the city's short distance transportation plan and its integration into a rail rapid transit system.

The Governing Mayor also drew attention to another decision of the new senate, which is intended to combat "overlapping:" in future, senators are not to hold mandates in supervisory and administrative councils. Only three exceptions will be permitted until the end of the legislative term. The senate will soon name qualified members of the administration to the remaining seats on the supervisory council.

Criticism of the Minimum Exchange

In the part of his statement dealing with policies concerning Germany Vogel said that the raising and expansion of the minimum exchange touched on the foundations of the agreements on travel and visits and was contrary to the spirit of understanding and also the goals of the Helsinki Accord. It was a restrictive measure, which principally affected Berliners in both parts of the city. Pointing out that the number of visits by West Berliners in East Berlin and the GDR had declined by about 60 percent, the Governing Mayor said: "The Senat of Berlin cannot accept this." In the meantime, those accompanying the blind and the most seriously handicapped traveling into the GDR had been exempted from the minimum exchange. The Senat could regard this as only a first step, which would have to be followed by others. "Only in this way can a German-German dialogue be resumed."

9581

CSO: 3103

GOVERNMENT MEDIUM-TERM ECONOMIC PLAN CRITICIZED

Rome CONQUISTE DE LAVORO in Italian 12 Jan 81 pp 1,8

[Article by Cesare Delpiano: "Timid Innovations"]

[Text] The 29 December 1980 meeting on the medium-term plan with La Malfa and his staff was mainly of a technical-informative nature and is preliminary to the political one to be produced with the president of the council before he may submit it to Parliament. That is why its interlocutory nature should be stressed. The text of the government's document reached the CGIL CISL UIL Federation on Christmas Eve and could not even be circulated among the union's members for their evaluation. In order to submit the first comments, the Secretariat and the experts who attended the 29 December 1980 meeting referred to the joint document which had been prepared by the last Executive Board and presented to the workers for debate. The meeting of the Joint Executive Board on 12 January 1981 will draw its own conclusions.

The union has long been pushing for a medium-term plan. Should it become a reality, this initiative would bear a new label: Given that this result would be the fruit of negotiation and joint decision, it will have to live with this "conquest" for a period of 3 years; should it offer, instead, a solution which is not shared, it will have to be involved in a massive action to remove goals and means, and to immediately change views and results.

It is hardly necessary to emphasize that the stakes are high and decisive, and that they compel the union to make its own consistent choices of lasting consequences as well, regarding that long sought-after concrete change which, until now, seemed contradictory. Above all, it is measured by the role it wishes to play: of becoming subject and active participant in the management of the economy.

The first considerations on the document covering the program submitted by Minister La Malfa lead us above all to express an opinion on the line we have followed so far since the Pandolfi plan. Ours has been a line of criticism which decidedly rejected salary cuts to the advantage of profits, according to a logic of automatic investments by business for an increase in employment and for the development of the south (which are still the union's main goal). Furthermore, we have always taken a decidedly critical stand which rejected remedial actions taken apart from structural ones (the "two steps"). The repeated attempts, all remedial, to freeze wage indexation and to reduce salary

burdens to limit, at the same time, consumption of low-income groups and thus to contain inflation, awaiting a recovery which may get us out of the crisis, have never borne tangible effects. They only have unilaterally unloaded on workers the country's crisis, a crisis for which they are the least responsible.

In any case, in a short period of time, all has always been nullified by the existing structure. The point is, therefore, to attack this real and deep cause of our crisis, of high inflation, of high unemployment, of the weakness in our economy and of its difficulty in competing on the international market.

At last it seems that our stance, after several hard encounters, is making an impact on the government's new document on the medium-term plan. Even La Malfa appears to be abandoning the project which was based on the same logic as the Pandolfi plan and which, even up to last July, he had submitted to us. Even with words still all to be well interpreted, he has formulated on a new economic basis what we can define as the "underlying" philosophy of the new medium-term plan.

In addition to the central, well-defined objectives of employment and the south and the logic of "one-step measures" and of a structural nature, the emerging economic philosophy is that of refraining from acting increasingly and exclusively on demand and reducing the spending of low-income groups, but instead developing supply with huge investments, through those main sectors capable of freeing our economy from a strong dependence on foreign countries, as can be deduced from the incurable state of our balance of payments and from the inflation that this state of affairs is causing. Relying on this basic reasoning and assuming that an additional 500,000 workers will be employed in a 3-year period, the formulation of the plan (which cannot be considered as such in its present stage) departs from a general and detailed macroeconomic structure and it develops over a series of sectorial plans for which outlines are submitted (energy, agriculture, industrial agriculture, industrial food, business, public administration, etc.).

For these plans, conditions and even divisible objectives are established. The plans must be geared to these conditions and, for this reason, they undergo constant control (control nucleus).

Under this aspect, the "project" appears practical and feasible and can also be accepted as an immediate and real basis for comparison, inasmuch as it avoids global and often abstract philosophies.

As a consequence, any forceful act toward wage indexation is abandoned, any threat of freezing contracts is limited to suggesting salary restraints and behavior among the parties still to be discussed among themselves and mainly directed toward productivity.

--The reasoning which is made to "drain" huge investments within the next 3 years and to manage to carry out sectorial plans, is to maintain linear the present fiscal level, to consistently reduce the public budget deficit for current expenditures (and this raises the question of tariffs and prices), to

increase investments with such savings (holding the budget deficit to the 1980 level) and to recur heavily (for about 50 percent) to foreign loans. Within this framework, the plan also estimates, as of 1981, the restitution of the fiscal drag to workers (and here one must stress an obvious macroscopic contradiction with the government's decision, to which we objected, to refrain in 1981 from this "restitution").

--If there is an innovative position and a change in the 3-year plan's logic compared with the past, there still remains substantial criticism of the plan's content and of the methods of its implementation; next to the visible lights shadows appear as substantive ambiguities due to some crucial aspects all of which must be clarified, completed, modified.

Above all, the union brings up the point of linking the present cycle to the medium-term plan, especially if its effective implementation should be delayed in 1981 and practically moved to 1982. There are diverging opinions on both the technical and the practical aspects of the plan. But it is important to stress that, should there be in practice a delay to 1982, the union cannot tolerate inactions or delays of economic policy decisions in 1981, and that an immediate confrontation on the urgency of the matter is unavoidable.

Furthermore, there is a real divergence between an estimated annual average increase of 3.5 percent in the gross national product (of which 2 percent and more for productivity) and an estimated increase of 500,000 new jobs at the end of 1983 (approximately 170,000 new jobs a year). This report requires a careful, critical verification in view of the increases due to productivity.

It is necessary, furthermore, to stress vigorously the crucial reservation on the huge reduction in the public budget current expenditures (reducing widened public expenditures) to drain means and investments: especially if this means increases in public tariffs and prices which affect low-income groups and workers without outlining themes and a political orientation through which they could eventually develop, thereby creating higher inflation, particularly if they are concentrated in a short period of time.

For the union, the question of revenues through fiscal means due to huge [tax] evasions, still occurring, as well as the change in the curve of tax percentages and the restitution in 1981 of the "fiscal drag" to workers, remains a crucial point to examine, which may constitute an alternative at least with respect to the big "cut" in current expenditures, especially in relation to public tariffs, to essential social services or to the renewal of contracts in the public sector.

It is obvious that a careful look should be given to the utilization of heavy foreign debts to evaluate pros and cons and to limit their conditions, thus avoiding freezing ourselves of a structural dependence on foreign countries to fall into another indebtedness to lenders not controllable by the union.

There is, then, the question of the sectional plans and territorial plans for the earthquake areas of the south (on which we are waiting for an "ad hoc" confrontation) and at least, of Calabria and Sardinia.

On this matter, there are three fundamental problems to solve: on the method, or how we proceed in a systematic bargaining confrontation over them, plan by plan, avoiding a "triangularity" and defining the single prospective party within the government with whom the confrontation should take place (if the project is the totality of sectional plans, this problem becomes central); on priority, in the sense of greater or lesser urgency and decisiveness, also in relation to the situation and within each of them (energy, agriculture, industrial agriculture, business, housing, etc); on content and revision, since we are dealing with outlines and not with complete plans and on these we have reservations.

The reform of the public administration seems to be essential for a "project" which has the ambition of initiating a programmatic plan in the country with the necessity of developing negotiations to achieve greater efficiency and commitment.

Last, the entire chapter on problems concerning labor and capital remains to be dealt with.

Here the union's reservation has been precisely made on all unclear points and it should be substantially reviewed in spite of the possible interest of certain sections (as, for instance, the Solidarity Fund) which run the risk, in view of how they are being presented, to backfire or to be cited only pro forma.

The debate remains, therefore, entirely open for us on these six crucial points we have summarily mentioned. As entirely open, it remains on contradictory aspects generated by the current behavior of the individual ministries or the entire government (see increases announced at the beginning of 1981 without consultation with the union). On these actions, and in particular on fiscal provisions for the earthquake without having yet budgeted any expenditures for the earthquake area, we are still waiting for an answer.

Fluid areas which could be interpreted either way or require an explicit clarification and those in contrast with the union's expectations, demand a serious involvement of workers to steer them in the right direction or to deeply modify them.

With the medium-term plan we are playing a serious game and we must be aware of that.

9758
CSO: 3104

POSTPONEMENT OF CGIL-CISL-UIL ASSEMBLY EXPLAINED

Rome CONQUISTE DEL LAVORO in Italian 12 Jan 81 pp 1,2

[Article by P. C.: "Reasons for the Postponement"]

[Text] The decision adopted by the Secretariat of the Federation CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] UIL [Italian Union of Labor] during the meeting which took place last 5 January are well know, as are the meetings (listed in the box below) scheduled by unions and workers for the purpose of confronting both the most urgent and the long-term problems. The reasons which led to these decisions should be just as familiar. In scanning the press and in following the various comments, it would appear that not all is clear, but that we are on the verge of very serious disagreements and only one step away from a situation in which each organization would definitely turn inward. In effect, without ignoring the terms of a debate which has had and still has aspects of disagreements among the organizations, we can affirm that the many and complex difficulties we are facing are neither more serious nor more insurmountable than those previously experienced. As in the past, a careful evaluation of the facts and a rational search for an acceptable common ground, inspired by a high degree of solidarity, has helped in defining means and more appropriate timing for renewed adequate action toward our present difficult problems and those we will face in the future.

As early as next week (Monday, 12 January), the Executive Board meeting will give us some indications. In the meantime, the confederations are examining carefully the government's proposal (draft of medium-term proposal) which should open a new phase of the confrontation on economic themes. So far, the other various government measures, even if prompted by a state of emergency, have not met the full approval of the union in view of the inadequacies and contradictions contained therein. The medium-term plan presents new goals, but all still to be examined, as Delpiano observes on this same page. In fact, we are talking about commitments that will have to be confirmed by results.

If for no other reason than for the sake of clarity, thought should be given to the present state of the union, characterized by the most recent decision to postpone the important and long-awaited Milan meeting. The fiat case, and the terrible disaster in Campania and Basilicata have absorbed all the energies of unions and workers of late. One could not complete entirely the process of

reflection and debate demanded by the complex material submitted to the workers' attention. Until now, practically there have been very few preparatory assemblies. The assembly's postponement, therefore, was based on objective, technical justifications. But we are aware that the reason does not lie in these facts only. The union is faced with the fundamental question of how to be ready for the eighties, knowing that the evolution of society, in its different aspects, demands new ways for facing problems, a different union role for participating in their solution. Here lies one of the fundamental issues of disagreement among the confederations. For the CISL, the time has come to forego (without reneging or neglecting the past) mere advocacy, to enter, instead, into a more active phase of participation in the administration of all social and economic events. We cannot believe that the establishment of the fund for Solidarity could be interpreted merely as the will to place on a hill a small flag that may be swept away at the first gust of the wind, rather than the first wedge, the first attack in a new way for intervening and participating in the management of the economy, that is, a new fundamental aspect of union's conduct.

It seemed, therefore, absurd that from a discussion on the new role of the union, such a "piece" (which is not an appendix, but a "body" whose absence alters completely the terms of the question) could be missing. On the fund, however, there still remain doubts by the union, which, in due course, had given autonomous and formal approval that is still valid.

All considered, (and because inward turnings were avoided that would have produced effects nobody would have wanted) we are pleased that the solution adopted by the Secretariat, and which the Executive board will not fail to evaluate favorably, has been reached. This is not to say that the matter of 0.50, as all other matters, may be forgotten without hope of reconsideration. It is a question, instead, of spending more time for a more profound and more complete study of complex issues, but even now everybody is unanimously convinced that the paths to take are clearly marked and that second thoughts are unthinkable.

In the meantime, there are proper times and means to confront the ever present problems, beginning, as previously mentioned, with those created by the medium-term plan in which it will be necessary to properly introduce matters concerning the reconstruction and rebirth of the earthquake areas and then to proceed with the issue of which policies to follow for the renewal of contracts, since their expirations are approaching, but, above all, in view of the emerging necessity to find answers to problems which in this field, (due to the lasting crisis and to the high rate of inflation combined with the development of technology) require immediate attention.

Decisions of CGIL-CISL-UIL Secretariat

--The assembly of general councils and delegates is postponed until after confederation congresses.

--The document approved for consultation is reformulated by the Executive Committee on 12 January updating parts of economic policy.

--A meeting is scheduled (4,5,6 March) to discuss problems of policy to follow for renewal of contracts with the urgent choices that must be made. This meeting, preceded by consultation with workers (to begin as of 15 January 1981), will be attended by delegates named by business and trade union leaders (1,000-1,500 persons).

--Consultations and decisions on the medium-term plan will be undertaken by the Joint Executive Board with the participation of categories and regional organizations (it will be held 24, 25 February).

--On 18 and 19 February a seminar will be held on basic themes of the democratization of the economy. The seminar will be attended by executives of the Joint Federation and expert economists invited by the Federation.

9758

CSO: 3104

BRIEFS

NORWEGIAN-SOVIET BUTTER DEAL NEGOTIATED--Norwegian dairies have started a butter caravan to the Soviet Union. The first trucks left yesterday and in the course of the next month more than 100 trucks will have made the trip to Leningrad via Stockholm, Norwegian Dairies Marketing Director Egil Saetveit told ARBEIDERBLADET. A Danish transport firm has won the contract for supplying the Russians with Norwegian butter. Saetveit told ARBEIDERBLADET that the agreement covers the supply of 1,500 tons of butter. The agreement means that the Norwegian butter surplus will be reduced by about 60 percent. The Norwegian butter has been bought at a price above the current world market price. The agreement is beneficial in the light of the buildup of surplus butter. [Excerpt] [LDO51729 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 4 Mar 81 p 9]

CSO: 3108

BALSEMAO-EANES GOVERNMENT: PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL STABILITY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 10 Jan 81 pp 2, 16

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa: "From Balsemao's Affirmation of Faith to the Political Support Speech by Eanes"]

[Excerpt] A Difficult Position

The position of Francisco Pinto Balsemao as prime minister is a particularly difficult one, in four respects:

Firstly, because he is a successor in heading a Democratic Alliance (AD) government. Political succession is always a delicate business under any circumstances when it comes to trying to compare the relative virtues of the preceding government head and his successor, particularly in the leadership of an organ of basic sovereignty such as the government is.

Secondly, Francisco Pinto Balsemao succeeds Francisco Sa Carneiro, an individual with charisma and prestige, and practically unchallenged leadership of his party and within the government coalition. To this must be added the fact that the experience of the Sixth Constitutional Government was positive politically, as reflected moreover in the electoral triumph on 5 October.

Thirdly, while succeeding a political leader who by his very nature cannot be replaced in terms of many of his characteristics, Francisco Pinto Balsemao must attempt to do so in an atmosphere which is no longer exactly the climate of euphoria which followed 5 October for the AD. The tragic death of Sa Carneiro and Amaro da Costa and the almost immediate defeat of the presidential proposal of which they were the two main defenders created a situation which is not at odds with a major portion of the overall AD project, but which must take into account the simple but politically undeniable fact represented by the electoral triumph of General Ramalho Eanes and his presence in Belem for a 5-year term.

Fourthly, and as the formation of the cabinet has revealed, there are those in the PSD [Social Democratic Party] who still fail to understand the serious risks of a certain party scattering, a continuing political interplay of personalities, a diffusion of responsibility, which corrodes the party solidity and cohesion and could inevitably lead the government itself into crisis.

In brief, the success of the AD project or lack of it depends on two basic factors: the durability of this cabinet and the capacity of the Alliance for stability and institutional strengthening, so that there will be no temptation to political division during the elections for the local government authorities in December 1982.

And the success of this cabinet or lack of it will depend less on the resistance of other sovereign bodies or the parliamentary opposition itself than on internal factors within the AD, more specifically the internal political balance within the PSD.

This having been said, it will be clear why the speech by and installation of Francisco Pinto Balsemao as prime minister of the Seventh Constitutional Government was particularly difficult.

This speech would, moreover, inevitably be compared with that made by Francisco Sa Carneiro a year ago, when he assumed leadership of the first AD government.

In substance, Balsemao was careful, intelligent and balanced.

Formally speaking, it may have been a bit long and may have gone into details, in one respect or another, better suited to his address to the assembly of the republic on presentation of the government program.

This preoccupation with detail may have resulted from the new prime minister's conviction that forces were already at work at the time of his installation, and that it would be there that he won or lost the political confidence of the AD voters, who have followed the current political situation with great interest and some apprehension.

An Affirmation of Faith

This was a careful speech--in the tone adopted, in the promises made, in the references to other sovereign bodies.

It was also a balanced speech, with one portion recalling and praising Sa Carneiro, another reiterating the basic content of the AD proposal, a program section with guidelines for the government, a portion describing the complex international situation, and finally, an epilogue designed to demonstrate the level of the political conviction and commitment of the government assuming office.

But above all it was an intelligent speech.

It was intelligent in the way it approached the problem of succeeding Sa Carneiro politically. It was intelligent in the stress placed on the AD program and the way in which it dealt with the importance of constitutional amendment.

It was intelligent in recalling the political significance of the 5 October elections, taking advantage of this opportunity to refer critically to the possible political exploitation of the 7 December election results by the opposition.

The reference made to Diogo Freitas do Amaral and the dialogue approach with which the new prime minister dealt with the democratic opposition were also intelligent.

In terms of program, the two main guidelines of his address were the liberation of civilian society with regard to the state and the dynamization and modernization of the Portuguese economy.

Although, as we have already noted, excessively detailed in certain respects, the program set forth shows the substantial level of internal consistency and overall planning.

Finally, it should be noted that Francisco Pinto Balsemao sought to give his address the symbolic value of an affirmation of faith as to the fate of his own government, with even greater enthusiasm since reservations evident in certain AD sectors about the formation of the government have been great.

This was the reason for the repeated mention of a government for four years, the reference made to the linking of constitutional revision with the activities of the government, the outline of the international prospects for the coming year, and the final "pitch" reflecting a great commitment to the success of this government.

There have sometimes been governments born under a seemingly precarious sign, but also with a political and personal commitment defying denigration or denial.

Such governments have not seemed very strong or exactly star-studded, but they have nonetheless revealed in the end a capacity to endure and to act much greater than would have been predicted.

Similarly, there are political figures whom the ordinary citizen would not have envisioned as prime ministers, but who once having accepted the challenge, made of it a crucial issue, a basic challenge to their lives.

And also there are sometimes surprises which transform the conciliatory into commanders and the negotiators into leaders.

There is a need for the capacity for leadership and command to be clearly asserted from the beginning, starting with cabinet itself, or in other words the effective political guidance of the various ministerial actions.

Clear Political Support

But if Balsemao's speech was to some extent surprising in the political level it revealed, the speech by Ramalho Eanes was no less so, in terms of its political content.

A year ago, Ramalho Eanes seemed extremely cold, not to say harsh, in his speech at the installation of the Sixth Constitutional Government.

He tried to explain that the government would not enjoy the best conditions for governing, he set himself apart from the executive branch and defined the boundaries of its jurisdiction with extreme rigidity, reasserting the presidential powers one by one.

This time, the speech by Ramalho Eanes revealed a radical change in political position, and the burial of the hatchet, so to speak, for at least the immediate future.

On the one hand, Eanes stressed his political confidence in the government several times, going so far as to praise the political actions of the prime minister in the defense of democracy.

On the other hand, Eanes explained why he believes that the institutional solidarity he is prepared to contribute to the cabinet is more important than political solidarity itself.

And in this connection, he did the opposite of what he did a year ago--instead of pointing out the presidential powers, he said nothing about them, indicating instead a broad field for executive activity and cooperation.

Thirdly, Eanes went further, warning at the outset that he will not tolerate the activities of inorganic pressure groups hindering the functioning of the sovereign bodies, a concept he voiced twice, providing a direct warning to any future inorganic movements offering economic, social or political opposition to the government.

In brief, the president of the republic could hardly have gone further in a speech extravagant in its support and understanding of the cabinet, perhaps unprecedented to date, even with the constitutional government.

To establish a link with his speech a year ago, Ramalho Eanes referred in passing to the conditions of a positive nature which also have an effect on the initial activities of this cabinet.

Finally, the words of praise of Sa Carneiro voice by Eanes and his reference to the continuity of political intentions adopted by this cabinet with regard to the preceding one should be noted.

This was a speech which exceeded all expectations, revealing the capacity of the president of the republic to adapt to the most diverse situations, and also showing his desire to avoid creating the slightest problem for the cabinet, rather to support it instead, the more so the more doubtful its future success might be.

If politics were pursued through speeches alone, the two given yesterday would mean that the seventh government is in an excellent position to govern.

It has the commitment of a prime minister whose address was a surprise even to those who have known and studied him for many years.

It can also count on the unexpected political support of the president of the republic, who seems to have saved for this beginning, so to speak, of his second term some surprises of the kind which come along when least expected, and which apparently will allow him to complete his first term smoothly and to rely fully on reelection for a second.

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PINTASILGO: BASES OF POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR EANES GOVERNMENT

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 16-22 Jan 81 pp 8-9

[Interview with former Prime Minister Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, by Caceres Monteiro; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] "The reelection of General Ramalho Eanes opens up very interesting prospects for the development of Portuguese society, and is at the same time an affirmation and a challenge," Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, 50, former prime minister, said in an interview granted to O JORNAL.

Lurdes Pintasilgo broke an almost total silence of several months, in terms of public statements, to describe to interviewer Caceres Monteiro what she is doing.

[Question] We would like to know if you felt some hesitation in giving your support to General Ramalho Eanes, when you were invited to join his political commission?

[Answer] Like many Portuguese citizens, I experienced extreme perplexity for some weeks following 5 October. But perplexity is not the same as hesitation. An analysis of the balance of forces on the political party scene never led to doubt of the support I voiced publicly beginning in March for the reelection of General Ramalho Eanes.

[Question] How do you interpret the results of the presidential election?

[Answer] In my view, the reelection of General Ramalho Eanes opens up very interesting prospects for the development of Portuguese society. It is at the same time an affirmation and a challenge. It affirms that the majority of the people specifically want the great bulwark of democracy safeguarded--and that not according to any abstract or platonic model, but in fidelity to the spirit of 25 April.

In limiting General Ramalho Eanes to the leftist sector and trying to "push him" increasingly toward the "revolutionary" aspects of 25 April, the Democratic Alliance achieved two cumulative effects. On the one hand, it served to confirm, for those who had forgotten it, that in his first term of office, General Ramalho Eanes enjoyed a legitimacy obtained not only from universal suffrage but from 25 April as well. On the other hand, it served to raise the conviction that there was "something" in 25 April it was important to safeguard to a higher level of Portuguese consciousness. The propaganda against Eanes did nothing but strengthen his image as the "April candidate."

[Question] You said it was a challenge...

[Answer] Certainly! It is a challenge to our capacity to interpret social phenomena and to our boldness in playing our role at a given moment in the movement of history.

[Question] And how do you interpret the base movement which developed around the candidacy of General Ramalho Eanes?

[Answer] I believe that this social and civic movement has to do with the capacity of the people to play a part in "causes" which pertain to them directly, which appeal to individuals to give the best of themselves, and which lead them to discover the multiple possibilities for joining together in common action.

Today we are witnessing a broadening of the concept of participation by individuals and the people's masses in political life. For years, the word "participation" was no more than a pious wish, without practical implementation. Later, talk of "participation" as a requirement of economic growth itself began to be heard. Today "participation" covers all sectors of social life and, specifically, political life. Now this means two things. On the one hand, it emphasizes and stresses the political dimensions of all individual actions, whatever the sector might be. On the other, it makes it clear that new paths are developing for the channeling of citizens' participation in a true democracy.

[Question] Do you believe, then, that the reelection of General Ramalho Eanes also says something about the concept of democracy itself?

[Answer] Without a doubt. The movement which developed around the candidacy of Eanes incorporated a number of dynamic forces scattered throughout Portuguese society. I am speaking of the role of recreational and cultural groups, organizations for local action and dynamization, groups of young people, women, etc.

In my view, real democracy must also rely on axes of this kind. Otherwise there is a limitation, a narrowing of the democratic field.

[Question] What about the political parties? Do you believe that they tend to ignore, or at least underestimate, these axes?

[Answer] Perhaps this happens when society is subordinated to the goals of the superstructures of their apparatus. Which is not, moreover, an "evil" specific to political parties. Every institution tends to create "ad intra" goals which are almost always in conflict with the "ad extra" goals which legitimize it as an institution. But precisely because it is thus, the political parties can overcome this difficulty by redoubled attention to the pulse of society in its daily life. Only the external impact can free them from this difficulty. Thus it seems normal to me that the political parties would devote proper attention to these axes of social life.

[Question] Do you believe that the movement produced by the campaign and later by the triumph of General Eanes is being properly exploited by the political forces and the individuals affiliated with the left?

[Answer] I hope that it is not being "exploited" in the narrow sense of the term! What I see is two developments. On the one hand, individuals have become aware that there is a large area for political convergence, moving from different political quadrants. On the other hand, the same individuals recognize that the common platform which was made possible was created out of groups and sectors corresponding to these "axes" of which we were just speaking. And what is certain is that these individuals have not yet been demobilized.

[Question] How do you interpret this?

[Answer] The fact is, in my view, that this platform already existed prior to the presidential campaign. It was not created out of nothing. It was an underground "movement" which already existed and which found the proper conditions for surfacing in the campaign of General Ramalho Eanes, perhaps because of the supraparty aspect of his candidacy. General Eanes' electoral campaign provided a great opportunity for the cooperative capacity of forces of very different sorts, not only in party terms, but also in terms of social and cultural concerns, to reveal itself. The possibility of creating something new in Portuguese social life became evident. We will see how this "seed" will germinate in the coming years.

[Question] Do you think that these phenomena of which you have been speaking are peculiar to our society, to our country?

[Answer] No, not at all. The genuine aspect of what is happening here clearly reveals the parallel with the identical phenomena occurring more or less everywhere, in diffuse form in the countries in the Southern Hemisphere, and in obvious and clearly outlined forms in the industrialized countries.

[Question] And what does the importance of this fact seem to you to be?

[Answer] On the one hand, the establishment of this consistency is one of the indices allowing us to state that we have the human potential and the historic sensitivity in Portugal which are needed to assess this "short circuit" of which we spoke a moment ago without fear. On the other hand, the establishment of this same fact makes a requirement of us: that we be capable of giving body to the new content of democracy (beyond the defense of freedoms and individual rights, obviously).

And it should not be thought that these new manifestations are typified in country A or country B. There are no foreign patterns to be imitated. It is we who must build our own model.

[Question] Changing the subject a little, you occupy a position in a political sector in which the PS [Socialist Party] is one of the most important focuses. Are you concerned therefore about the present situation of the PS?

[Answer] Yes and no. On the one hand, I relate what is happening with the Socialist Party in Portugal, to the extent that I see that the challenges have much in common, with what is happening with other socialist parties in other European countries. It is the socialist program itself which is in a phase of reformulation. On the other hand, I sometimes fear--without justification, I hope--that much of the potential of the Socialist Party and the tremendous wealth it has in individuals,

competence and dynamism (which I have had occasion to verify in the field)-- that all this will be diffused on problems of structure and its internal life. In my opinion, the Socialist Party bears a tremendous historic responsibility, now that it is free of the responsibility of managing a crisis as a government. It has a unique potential for conceiving of and testing new paths. From this point of view, perhaps it would even be desirable for the "ferment" within the Socialist Party to become still more intense!

[Question] Do you share the expectation in certain leftist circles about the beginning of this government's activities?

[Answer] At this time, and you will understand what I am saying as a way of locating myself in relation to society and politics--I believe that we are entering into a phase of greater institutional stability, and therefore any government must be viewed relatively, because we will not have to judge on the basis of a limited period. The government has a long time ahead of it in which to govern, and therefore we must not all stand on tiptoe peering over the heads of others to see what the actors on the stage are doing! We will judge from the results. For now, I cannot say I am particularly interested in the circumstantial advances or retreats of individual A or individual B, in terms of the establishment of cabinets, the adoption of temporary positions in time, etc.

As is known, the political superstructure has not by any means exhausted my civic commitment. On the contrary, I think that all our forces are not too much for weaving the fabric of the new society with intelligence and concern, for incorporating, with imagination and perseverance, the creative dynamism which, indirectly or obviously, will lead us to a new social and cultural frontier.

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MARQUES ASSUMES LEADERSHIP POSITION IN YOUNG SOCIALISTS

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 16-22 Jan 81 p 7

[Text] A woman, Margarida Marques, has been appointed to a post established for the first time in Socialist Youth: coordinating secretary. She promises to give new life to a youth organization that has been somewhat lethargic up to now.



Margarida Marques
"Expansion of the FRS into
other democratic areas."

Maria Margarida Ferreira Marques, 26 years old, licentiate in mathematics, employee in the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, belongs to the group that founded JS [Socialist Youth] in May 1974 and that also includes, among others, Arons de Carvalho, Jose Leitao, Jose Castelo and Manuela Rego. She is the first woman to assume the post of coordinating secretary of JS, a fact that she says "results from her militancy and from the new kind of relationship that has been developing among young persons."

According to Margarida Marques, the decentralization sought for JS is expressed well "in the thorough modifications introduced in the statutes, by means of which a political delegate of the cell, a national Secretariat that now includes representatives from other areas in addition to Lisbon and federation congresses that will play a basic part in determining regional strategy were established."

One of the innovations that emerged from the Fourth JS Congress was the post of coordinating secretary responsible for orienting the activity of the Secretariat and of representing the organization both within and outside. Does this not conflict with the already mentioned decentralization? Margarida Marques does not believe so and stated:

"The coordinating secretary always existed, from Arons de Carvalho to Jose Leitao, although not by statute. As of now and in accordance with the statutes, his powers are defined. It was important for this to take place, for everything to be very definite. To tell the truth, the former secretaries had the same powers, only they were not specified in the role."

The other task indicated for priority execution -- extension and intensification of JS participation in the youth sector -- is directly connected with decentralization. Margarida Marques pointed out that "for that purpose, we are preparing an expanded, revised program whose objectives are, among others, the acquisition of new rights for young workers, struggle for a new way of life in schools, establishment of a new culture, invigoration of local authorities, struggle for mass sports and for dignification of life in the countryside."

Also on the subject of the congress held last weekend, Margarida Marques described the fact that two tickets emerged as "healthy, because it is important for that to happen as long as there is internal contest for positions."

At the same time, a proposal envisaging the right to factions was rejected. In this connection, Margarida Marques pointed out that the statutes allow this, only prohibiting the existence of factions organized independently, as was sought in that proposal."

No Agreement With JSD

With regard to the policy on coalitions, especially concerning election in the field of education, Margarida Marques specified that the main objective will be "defeat of the right in schools."

"We shall be allied with the youth movements of ASDI [Independent Social Democratic Association] and UEDS [Leftist Union for Socialist Democracy] and with all young persons who advocate democratic socialism."

Concerning Communist Youth and Social Democratic Youth [JSD], Margarida Marques admitted the "vague possibility" that JS will ally itself with Communist Youth "in very special cases, as is happening in the Higher Technical Institute," but she rejected any other kind of agreement, "even specific," with the social democrats.

What is the position of JS with regard to the secretary general, Mario Soares? Margarida Marques preferred the question in broader terms, in other words, JS/factions within PS [Socialist Party], and she stated:

"Our victory does not mean victory of any of the factions existing within PS. Obviously, we follow closely what is going on, but we defend our autonomy in the action and strategy to be adopted. We operate among young persons, therefore our practice will have to be different with regard to the party."

The article by Sottomayor Cardia, published in O JORNAL, in which the need for modernization of the PS is pointed out was mentioned. "The PS does not exactly have to modernize itself, but, rather, to clear up a certain number of political questions and to intensify its participation in the various social strata. One of the fields of action will have to be protection of the quality of life by taking more concrete stands, for example, on ecology."

Finally, with reference to FRS (Republican and Socialist Front), Margarida Marques advocated its expansion to other "democratic areas." She also believes that this coalition "was not established merely for the elections and it has acquired, however, a vigor of its own."

In the Vila do Conde congress, the ticket headed by Margarida Marques won the election held there for the JS National Committee. In that election, that ticket was opposed by another one headed by Luis Patrao, deputy to the Assembly of the Republic representing JS.

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POLITICAL PROSPECTS FOR POSSIBLE PS-PCP LEFTIST GOVERNMENT

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 17 Jan 81 pp 8R-9R

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva: "The Left Does Not Exist"]

[Text] The statement, made abruptly in this way, may seem provocative. This is not, however, the intention. The truth is that to speak of the "left" in Portugal today does not mean anything, strictly speaking.

The proof is very readily provided.

The Portuguese left wing does not have, nor could it have, a common government program. For an obvious reason--because a government program requires a minimal agreement as to the model of society to be developed--and there is no model of society acceptable to the two great parties of the left in Portugal, the PS [Socialist Party] and the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party].

The Communist Party has its own model of society, a tested alternative, which is the Soviet model, with a single party and state control. The Socialist Party does not have an alternative model for society, much less one tested anywhere, but while rejecting the initial Soviet experience, it accepts, at least pending the arrival of "better days," the Western model as it exists--formal democracy, the party system, and free enterprise economically, more or less moderated by the state.

Thus while the PCP aspires to complete subversion "of that which is," has as its goal the replacement of the existing model by another entirely different one, and in this sense is daily doing whatever may corrode the system, the PS, while it waits, is at least working for the defense of the system.

In times of crisis in the institutions of the democratic state, therefore, and whenever the balance of forces is theoretically favorable to the "left," the PS and the PCP inevitably find themselves on different sides of the barricades. The PCP alone, or sometimes in alliance with the extreme leftist parties, confronts the PS, making common cause with the parties of the right.

This is what happened in 1975.

It can be conjectured that if it were possible to obliterate the year 1975 from history, a leftist alliance would be a hypothesis which need not be rejected. Perhaps. The truth is, however, that 1975 did exist. And one of the things which the general attempt at socialist revolution made clear was precisely the radical incompatibility between the socialist and communist parties of Portugal.

One can conclude then, that the left, i.e., the PS and PCP together, cannot govern in Portugal, at least so long as the PCP is what it is and the memory of the revolutionary period endures. But if this is flexible, what is not so much so, although no less true, is that the left is also unable to constitute the opposition in Portugal.

The matter is simple.

On the day when the PS agrees to form a common front to oppose the right wing with the PCP, it will do away with itself as an alternative for government, because at that point the electorate would be led to believe that the socialists had changed their views, rejecting their recent past, and finally accepting as proper the communist thesis that without a revolution breaking the grip of the right wing once and for all, there will be no progress in Portugal. While democracy prevails and the PS thinks that it can win government power, the socialists will have to make it understood that the reasons motivating them and leading them into the opposition are different from those of the communists. That the PCP wants revolution while the PS does not want revolution, but only a different kind of management of public affairs. That the PCP wants to subvert the society we have, while the PS only aspires to govern it in a more just fashion.

The Socialist Party can therefore not join hands with the Communist Party in the opposition in any case. Its opposition will always be autonomous opposition.

Therefore the left does not exist politically speaking. This is a word which means nothing, and since this is the case, it serves only to confuse. What we do have is two parties which claim to be "leftist" but in fact are different things--and cannot agree either in order to govern or to constitute the opposition.

But if the left does not exist (unlike the right, in which the two main component forces, the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], agree on a given model of society, thus being able to reach agreement on a government program), if what does exist is a communist party and a socialist party condemned to live perhaps forever separate one from the other, then we must consider the possibilities available to each of them "on its own" to offer an alternative to a rightwing government.

The Negative Votes of the Socialist Electorate

First of all, the PCP.

It must be realized that the potentials for the Communist Party to win power are limited or even nonexistent, at least within the democratic framework. The communist parties, moreover, were not created to win power by the vote, but to do so by means of revolution.

From this point of view, elections are for the PCP an evil which the party cannot avoid. It should be noted that there is no correlation between the electoral results achieved by the Communist Party and its capacity to mobilize the masses and to organize and implement major demonstrations to shouts of "forward," always giving the impression that it is stronger than ever, that its apparatus is incomparable. The elections reveal a Communist Party which is stationary from an electoral

viewpoint and last on the list of the four main Portuguese parties which regularly pour cold water on the militant euphoria. If it were not for the elections, the PCP would have distinctly greater strength and its influence on public life would be very much greater.

The situation of the PS is completely different.

The PS is a party of another type. Like the PSD and the CDS, it is a party in the liberal tradition, the strength of which lies not in the perfection of its apparatus or its capacity to infiltrate, politicize or mobilize the masses within it, but in the number of votes it can win, that is to say the number of citizens it can win over in each electoral campaign.

It could be said that while the strength of the Communist Party is "within it," and because it can function in a consistent manner, not subject to major fluctuations, the strength of the Socialist Party is "outside it" to the extent that it depends on the electoral results each time. And for this reason, communist parties really have meaning within a single party system, while socialist parties have none without a multiparty system.

The PS is then basically an "electoral reality." It is of interest, then, to see what electoral "reality" the Socialist Party of Portugal enjoys today.

As I see it, the socialist electorate is divided into three main categories. The first is made up of those who continue to believe in "socialism," although they do not identify it (or have ceased to do so) with the Soviet experience. They are idealists, for whom the word "socialism" takes on a mainly magic value, since they are not capable of defining precisely, nor do they know, how it can be achieved. They merely believe that there is a more humane and a more just world beyond the injustice of the capitalist society. They call it socialism. And they vote for the PS, not so much because of what its leaders say or do, but because they believe that it is the least of the evils among the possible alternatives.

The second category includes those for whom the right wing means the rich and the left wing means the poor. Since they are not rich, they do not vote for the right. Fearing the convulsions and major changes they associate with communism, they do not vote for the PCP. This group is made up of men and women who are neither rich nor poor, whose thinking is traditional, who are generally Catholics or who at least do not challenge the role of faith and the message of the Church. They accept society as it is, while looking forward to greater justice and a somewhat easier life.

The third category is made up of those whose reasons for voting are above all tactical in nature, and who for this or that reason (from a desire for liberty to a preference for the continuation of a certain political confusion in which opportunistic factions will have an easier time) cast votes for a "vague authority." They vote for the PS because the Socialist Party, in government, would be the most permissive, and when it is in the opposition it is in the best position, from an electoral point of view, to function as a counterweight to the right wing.

From the above, if it is true, it can be concluded that voters support the Socialist Party today less because of what it is than because of what it is not and what the

others are. While the votes for the PCP or the AD [Democratic Alliance] are affirmative votes, meaning support of a model or a program, the votes for the PS are negative votes, representing more nearly a rejection of the known models than the support of any specific proposal for society.

The "electoral reality" of the Socialist Party, then, is an "indefinable" reality. The PS voters do not know exactly why they vote for the PS--what they do know, more or less certainly or justly, is why they do not vote for the PCP or a rightwing party.

This is the first reason for which it appears to me that the Socialist Party does not represent an alternative to the AD today. For a party to represent a real government alternative, it must have a minimally consistent electorate which knows what it wants, which is capable of providing the party government with solid support. While the socialist electorate is an inconsistent electorate, which knows above all what it does not want, but to a very limited extent what it does want, in the event that the party should one day win power in the government it would be unable to provide a solid and stable base of support for the government policy. This was, moreover, what was seen during 1976. The PS, when it was in government, never had a social base capable of supporting its policy.

An Old Image

But there are at least two other reasons preventing the left from being an alternative to the right in the medium time range.

One is that the image of the left is an old and threadbare one. In 1973, the left meant for many people hope, progress, the future. Today, only 6 and 1/2 years after 25 April, the left means the past for many people. Without much risk of protest it could be said that if any political force succeeded in developing a future image for itself in the last two legislative elections, it was the AD, rather than the PS or the PCP.

The PCP is the party of antifascist resistance and the euphoria of the Goncalvo period, both of which belong to the past. The PS is the party of antifascism pursued with a certain First Republic nostalgia--resistance to the Goncalvo faction and government for which there seems to be no excessive nostalgia, to judge from the high level of prestige retained by General Eanes, who was mainly responsible for the interruption of the socialist government experiment. The feeling one has is that the existing left belongs to a time which has passed, and that no one, basically, with the exception perhaps of the communists, really wants it to return.

The other reason for which the Socialist Party could hardly win power in the immediate future has to do with another problem already dealt with in an earlier article.

The problem is that power on the left is divided: The votes are on one side (the PS), and the trade unions on the other (the PCP). Now if the PS has no alternative model for society, as we have seen, and if for this very reason its inclination (like that of all the European socialist or social democratic parties, moreover) is to manage the existing society, that is the capitalist society, while on the other hand it cannot offer "social peace" because it does not control the trade unions, what then has the PS to offer capitalism?

The normal thing is for a capitalist society to be governed by the right wing. This only fails to be the case in countries where the workers' organizations take on great importance, and wherever and whenever the traditional right wing proves incapable of engaging in dialogue with the trade unions. It is at this point that the socialist parties enter the fray. Without rejecting the model of society, and without representing a threat to the established order, while on the other hand controlling the trade union movement, they can offer clear and less conflicting labor relations.

Enterprise administrations, businessmen and the upper classes compromise. There are some adjustments to taxation, some sectors are nationalized, state control over the economy is increased, and the maneuvering room of the liberal sector is reduced. However, in exchange they obtain calm, tranquillity, an end to guerrilla warfare. In a social democracy, the employers can sleep at night in calm and serenity. If trade union problems arise, it is the social democrats who resolve them--that is why they are in the government.

Note, for example, what happened in the English democracy, where more than once conservative governments have fallen as a result of prolonged strikes which could only be resolved after the laborites were put in power.

And what is happening in Portugal? We, like the other countries, have an orderly, civilized Socialist Party which does not want a revolution. Only the Socialist Party we have is not in a position to offer peace in the factories and the rural sector. Because the trade union movement is not socialist, but communist; because it does not have social democracy as its goal, but socialism; because it does not want to preserve what exists but to replace it with something different; because, this being the case, it does not want peace, but war.

The Socialist Party claims to want something of the owners--but it really has nothing to offer them in exchange.

This is the third reason why the PS is not, nor can it in the medium time range be, an alternative to the right wing. While this situation remains, alternation in power will be a pretty expression to embellish the speeches, but it will not be a possibility for consideration by those who claim to have a clear view of reality.

The problem of access to power for the socialists cannot be viewed in these terms today.

The only way in which the PS could win power in the immediate future is not by replacing the right wing, but precisely by "collaboration with the right wing," i.e., hand in hand with it. The raw and cruel truth is that the PS can only come to government power in the next few years if it is not alone and opposed to the right, but rather working with it.

It is this hypothesis with which we will deal in next week's article. In it we will also discuss the situation within the PCP and its foreseeable development, and the consequences of the triumph of General Ramalho Eanes in the presidential election for the so-called Portuguese left.

CONCEPTS FOR RESTRUCTURING, REORIENTING SOCIALIST PARTY

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 9-15 Jan 81 p 9

[Article by former Secretariat member and current Socialist Party Steering Committee member Sottomayor Cardia: "Modernizing the PS"]

[Text] The time has come for the Socialist Party to initiate a serious effort to modernize its program and its struggle. The next congress should give the necessary signal for modernization of Portuguese socialism.

A political party only takes on its real identity when, after the initial establishment phase, it makes an effort to reflect and discuss future prospects in the light of past experience.

The present circumstances of the nation's activity provide an opportunity, exceptional perhaps, for reflection and discussion, without limits of circumstance, on the objectives of the PS [Socialist Party].

It is practically undeniable that the party's declaration of principles and its program do not fit in either with the modern concept of socialism or with the party's real situation.

The next congress should not fail to concern itself with the problem. The decision on the work that the party must take on as a whole by means of an entirely open process also must not be postponed unnecessarily.

When there is a desire to modernize, discussion on the objectives logically precedes any decision on internal organization. The PS needs no patchwork. It needs an open, calm, objective discussion of ideas on the plan that it should propose to the country. Only in that way will we know ourselves and make ourselves known.

As only a contribution to the necessary discussion on a new programmatic declaration by the PS, a simple preliminary sketch of the general bases of that declaration are presented. Naturally, I am exclusively responsible for the text, but it has had the benefit of a group analysis.

The following are the topics:

Preliminary Sketch of the General Bases of a New Programmatic Declaration

The PS is the political organization of Portuguese seeking in democratic socialism a solution to the nation's problems and an answer to the sociopolitical requirements of our times.

The PS strives to have Portuguese society organized on the basis of the values of security, freedom, prosperity, social justice and solidarity.

The PS regards protection of the basic rights and freedoms of the citizens and of political democracy in the organization of society to be of primary importance.

The PS believes that democratization of society should be accomplished in its multiple political, economic and cultural aspects.

The PS struggles for the establishment of a society in which the differentiation in situations is the one strictly necessary for economic and cultural initiative in which this differentiation is solely in accordance with a person's merit, in which the social order based on classes is replaced so that everyone will have equal opportunities and in which the ties of human solidarity are developed to the maximum.

The PS advocates an economy open to a plurality of initiatives, in which democratic authority controls production activity especially indirectly, in order to stimulate production factors and to permit the workers to have a constantly stronger voice in decisions affecting business activity.

The PS struggles for independence of the political authority with regard to the economic authority, opposing capitalism or the exercise of political authority based on material patrimony and likewise rejecting liberalism and collectivism as regulatory principles of the economic order.

The PS believes that the sphere of action of the citizens should be maximum in everything that is not socially unsuitable and it advocates development of action leading to the workers' democratic participation in the struggle for a more humane life.

The PS aspires to full achievement of social justice, advocating a set of reforms that will expand and improve the organization of public services intended for meeting social needs, that will make possible a better redistribution of income resulting from wealth produced, that will protect the consumer, that will encourage the cooperative movement, that will lead, finally, to an improvement in the quality of life and to personalized utilization of free time, regardless of sex and age.

The PS believes that recourse to social expropriation of property -- nationalization or majority participation -- is adequate when it is the most effective way for assuring the functioning of an activity of recognized public interest.

The PS gives no preference to any philosophical or religious doctrine, recognizing for its party members full freedom of doctrinary choice.

The PS, established in the struggle against fascism and a member of the Socialist International, is in solidarity with all the forces in the world that are struggling

for freedom, for democracy and for democratic socialism. It opposes all kinds of racism and colonialism and it advocates the establishment of a more just international order, based on protection of human rights, on balanced disarmament and that will contribute to peace and to laying the groundwork for a true dialog between developed countries and developing countries.

The PS proposes, by modernizing the historical tradition of the worker movement, to develop the struggle of the workers for their emancipation. It supports the organization of city workers and employees, of farmers and rural wage-earners, of small and medium-sized businessmen, of executives and intellectuals, of teachers and students in democratic labor unions independent of political forces and in other associations.

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